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Defendants and Respondents
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal raises the question of whether the Second
Amended Complaint of the Plaintiff and Appellant herein sets forth a cause of action upon which relief may be
granted and thereby raises the question of whether an
architect employed by an owner to prepare plans, specifications and to supervise all of the work, can be negligent
and thereby become liable to an injured employee of the
general contractor that is injured during the construction of the job.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court entered a Final Order against Plaintiff and Appellant, holding the Second Amended Complaint of Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief upon
which relief may be granted.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and Appellant seeks reversal of the lower
Court's Final Order of Dismissal of Second Amended
Complaint and a ruling that Plaintiff and Appellant's
Second Amended Complaint states a cause of action upon
which relief may be granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Complaint of the Plaintiff was filed. After motions
of the Defendants, a First Amended Complaint was filed
and shortly before the Final Order of the District Court
dismissing the Complaint of the Plaintiff and Appellant,
the Second Amended Complaint was filed. At no time
did the Defendants and Respondents file an Answer to 1
either of the Complaints filed by the Plaintiff and Ap·
pellant. The Second Amended Complaint of the Plain·
tiff and Appellant was filed in the District Court on the '
16th day of March, 1966, and the Court, on the 18th day
of March, 1966, entered an Order dismissing with prej·
udice the Complaints of the Plaintiff. The Second
Amended Complaint of the Plaintiff and Appellant is
found in the record filed with the Supreme Court on '
pages 146 through 163. It seems necessary to repeat
the pertinent terms thereof exactly for the scrutiny of
the Court in their determination of whether the said
Second Amended Complaint does state a cause of action
upon which relief may be granted.
Attached to the Second Amended Complaint was an
exhibit identified as Exhibit "A", which was annexed to
the Complaint and incorporated therein by reference.
The Exhibit "A" is an Agreement by and between Salt ,
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Lake City Corporation and Harold K. Beecher and Associates, dated the first day of March, 1960, from which
the employment of the defendants arose. The pertinent
portion of the Second Amended Complaint is reproduced
3.S follows:
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HAROLD K. BEECHER
AND ASSOCIATES, a
Utah corporation, and
HAROLD K. BEECHER,
an Individual,

SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT
Civil No. 157284

Defendants
Comes now the plaintiff and complains of the defendants
as follows:
COUNT I
1. That at all times herein mentioned, the defendant
Harold K. Beecher and Associates, a Utah corporation,
was and now is a Utah corporation duly licensed to do
business as an architect in the State of Utah and that
during said times alleged herein, the defendant Harold K.
Beecher, an individual, was a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and was duly licensed to do business as
an architect in the State of Utah, and at all times herein,
was an officer, director and general manager of defendant
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corporation and was in charge of and had general supervision over the defendant corporation's operations under
that certain architect's Agreement referred to in paragraph 2 hereof.
2. That on or about March 1, 1960, the defendants entered into an Agreement with Salt Lake City Corporation, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah, to provide professional architectural services in connection
with the proposed construction of a Public Safety and
Jail Building in said City, in accordance with said Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"
and incorporated herein by reference.
3. That paragraphs 1 and 7 of the Agreement referred
to in paragraph 2 above provide in part as follows:

"1. THE ARCHITECT'S SERVICES. The architect's
professional services consist of the necessary conferences, the preparation of schematic and preliminary studies, working drawings, specifications, large
scale and full size detail drawings for architectural,
structural, plumbing, heating, electrical, and other
mechanical work; assist in the drafting of forms of
proposals and contracts to conform to Owner's standard requirements;***."
"7. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION. The Architect
shall furnish at his expense a qualified on-site in·
spector, acceptable to both Owner and Architect,
during the entire time the construction work is in
progress, whose duties shall consist of checking all
shop drawings, for approval of the City Engineer, to
determine the quality and acceptance of the material
and/or equipment proposed to be used in the facilities being constructed; to supervise and inspect all
phases of the work being done."
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4. That on or about May 20, 1960, the defendant corporation, as Architect, entered into an Agreement with
Salt Lake County, a political subdivision of the State of
Utah, as Owner, to provide professional architectural
services in connection with the proposed construction of
a Public Safety and Jail Building in Salt Lake City.
5. That paragraph 1 of the Agreement referred to in
paragraph 4 above provides as follows:
"1. The parties hereto hereby incorporate by ref erence the terms and conditions of the Agreement entered into on or about the first day of March, 1960,
by and between the Architect and Salt Lake City
Corporation, a Municipal Corporation of the State of
Utah a copy of which is annexed hereto as Exhibit
"A", so far as the provisions thereof are applicable,
and as modified by the terms and conditions contained herein, and provided that the name of the
Owner herein shall be substituted therein wherever
the name of said Salt Lake City Corporation appears,
and the Board of County Commissioners shall be
substituted therein wherever the name of the City
Commissioners appears, and the project referred to
therein shall refer to the project herein c.escribed."

6. That pursuant to the foregoing Agreements for
architectural services, the defendants prepared the specifications, bidding and contract documents for the construction of the Public Safety and Jail Building on behalf
of Salt Lake City Corporation and Salt Lake County, all
of which are set forth in that certain Contract dated
June 18, 1963, by and between Salt Lake City, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Utah, and Salt Lake
County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Utah, acting in concert and referred to therein as the Joint Au-
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thority and Christiansen Brothers, Inc., a corporation,
therein called the Contractor.
7. That the Contract referred to in paragraph 6 consisted of the following complimentary documents, all of
which formed said Contract according to paragraph 10
of the Special Conditions thereof: The Contract, Instructions to Bidders, General Conditions, Special Conditions,
Drawings and Specifications, Notice to Contractors, Bid
Proposal and Bond, including all addenda incorporated in
the documents before their execution.
8. That paragraph 3 (b) of the General Conditions Section of the Contract referred to in paragraph 6 above
provides as follows:
"3 (b). Whenever in these Specifications, the Contract or any supplementary agreements or instruments in which these specifications govern, the
words 'Architect' or 'Architects and Associates' appears, it shall be interpreted to mean Harold K.
Beecher and Associates, who, under contract, furnished the Drawings and Specifications for this work
and who will direct the supervision of the construction and is acting in cooperation with the City Engineer and the County Engineer as outlined above
through paragraph 3 and 3 (a)."
9. That paragraph 3 ( c) and 12 (a) of the General Contrac t Section of Contract ref erred to i n paragraph 6
above, provide as follows:
"3(c). The Contractor, his Superintendent and
Foreman, shall promptly obey and follow every
order or direction which shall be given by the Architect and/or the City Engineer or the County Engineer in accordance with the terms of the Contract."
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"12(a). If, in the judgment of the Architect and/or
the City Engineer or County Engineer, it is necessary to close down the work due to inclement
weather or due to other circumstances arising during the progress of the work, that may be construed
to be dangerous or that may be caused by non-compliance with the Specifications; the Contractor shall
comply and he shall stop all operations upon written
notice from the Architect and/or City Engineer or
County Engineer so to do, and the work shall remain
closed down until further orders in writing are given
by said Architect and/or City Engineer or County
Engineer to the Contractor to proceed with the work
of the project, and there shall be no claim against
either Salt Lake City Corporation or Salt Lake County or the Architect or Engineers, for such action."
10. That paragraphs 1 (b) and 17 (a) of the Special Conditions Section of the Contract referred to in paragraph
6 above provides as follows:
"1 (b). The Contractor shall take all necessary precautions for the safety of the public and employees
on the work and shall comply with all applicable provisions of Federal, State and Municipal Safety Laws
and Building Codes to prevent accidents or injury
to persons on, about or adjacent to the premises
where the work is being performed. He shall erect
and properly maintain at all times, as required by
the conditions and progress of the work, all necessary safeguards for the protection of the public and
workmen and shall post danger signs warning
against hazardous conditions."
"17 (a) . Shoring: Con tractor shall provide and be
responsible for all temporary shoring required for
executing and protecting the work."
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11. That on page 2 of Section of the Contract referred
to in paragraph 6 above, relating to "EXCAVATION
FILL AND GRADING'', under the sub-heading of'
"SHEET PILING" it is provided as follows:
"In excavating near or against necessary remaining
buildings, or to safeguard life and property when
earth banks are too deep or are too steep, this SubContractor shall provide adequate sheet piling to
prevent failure of adjoining foundations or to protect
workmen."
12. That pursuant to the Contracts hereinabove referred to, the defendants undertook the inspection of the
construction project on behalf of Salt Lake City Corporation for the purpose of determining whether said work
was being done in accordance with the plans, specifications and contract therefor and for the enforcement of
safety regulations and procedures for the protection of
workmen on said construction project.
13. That on or about October 17, 1963, in Salt Lake City,
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, at a point approximately 35 yards west of Second East Street in said city
at the construction site of an underground connecting
service tunnel located between the Salt Lake City and
Salt Lake County Building and the Public Safety and
Jail Building which was part of the construction included
within the Contracts hereinabove referred to, and which
work was being done by Christiansen Brothers, Inc., the
general contractor, a portion of the 25 foot high earthen
embankment of said tunnel excavation caved in upon the
plaintiff, a construction employee on said project, trapping and crushing him under wooden cement forms, mud
and earth, for approximately forty ( 40) minutes, caus-
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ing the plaintiff to suffer total, permanent and complete
disability and paralysis in each and every limb of his
body, in his body trunk, in his bodily function, including
control of vital organs and excretion, and in his muscle
function as a result of the injuries suffered by him in said
accident.
14. That the excavation for the construction of said
underground service tunnel was dangerous and unsafe,
causing an extreme hazard to the workmen therein; that
said excavation did not comply with the safety regulations of the Utah State Industrial Commission which
were then in force and effect; and that said defendants
both knew said dangerous condition for many days prior
to said accident and negligently failed to shut down the
work on said tunnel as they had the duty and authority
to do.
15. That as a direct and proximate result of the defendants' negligence, the plaintiff has suffered the following injuries and physical impairments: ...
(a) Crushed and broken vertebrae in the neck in two
places.
(b) Permanent paralysis from the neck down, resulting in complete loss of ability to control hands,
arms, feet, legs and bodily functions.
(d) Kidney infection controlled by anti-biotic drugs,
but which doctors have no hope of curing.
(e) Constant nausea, upset stomach, inability to eat,
and necessity of special diet.
(f) Loss of breathing control.
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(g) Constant and unrelenting headaches and pain in
neck, back, legs and toes.
(h) Constant sore throat.
(i) Infected toenail which drugs fail to heal.
(j) Permanent and total loss of normal bodily functions such as walking, standing, sitting up, controlling excreta, etc.
(k) Loss of body tissue.
(1) Other injuries and losses of bodily functions relating to the foregoing.

16. That as a direct and proximate result of the defendants' negligence, the plaintiff's resulting injuries have
caused, do now cause and will in the future cause the
plaintiff to suffer great pain and mental anguish, permanent confinement, continuing medical treatment and
wasting away of body tissue; that said injuries have deprived the plaintiff of his normal association with his
wife and children and they with him; that said injuries
have rendered the plaintiff unable to provide his family
with his loving guidance and physical and financial support; and that said injuries have permanently and totally
disabled the plaintiff from earning a livelihood for himself and his family for the remainder of his natural life
without any hope of recovery, all to his general damage
in the swn of $520,000.00.
17. That as a direct and proximate result of the defendants' negligence and plaintiff's resultant injuries,
the plaintiff has suffered a loss of wages in the amount
of $20,000.00 to date and his incurred up to the present
time doctor bills, hospital bills and special care bills,
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nursing bills and other medical expenses in the amount
of $30,000.00, and is at the present time undergoing continuous medical treatment for which additional special
damages will accrue to the plaintiff prior to the trial of
this action.
18. That as a direct and proximate result of the defendants' negligence as aforesaid, and of said injuries, it
will in the future be necessary for plaintiff to, and he
will, secure further medical care and attention of the
reasonable value of $300,000.00 for which he will be required to pay said sum and by reason thereof, plaintiff
has been further damaged in the sum of $300,000.00.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment in the
amount of $520,000.00 general damages and $330,000.00
special damages, together with his costs and disbursements incurred herein and such other and further relief
as the Court deems just in the premises, against each of
the defendants jointly and severally.
COUNT II
Comes now the plaintiff and as an alternative cause of
action alleges as follows:
1 - 13. As paragraphs 1 through 13 of this Count II, the
plaintiff herein incorporates paragraphs 1 to 13, inclusive,
of Count I.
14. That the excavation for the construction of the said
underground service tunnel was dangerous and unsafe,
causing an extreme hazard to the workmen therein; that
said excavation did not comply with the safety regulations of the Utah State Industrial Commission which
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were then in full force and effect; and that the defendants
knew of said dangerous conditions for many days prior
to the said accident and failed to shut down the work on
said tunnel as they had the duty and authority to do under the foregoing Agreements.
15. That the plaintiff was a construction employee on
said project and was therefore a member of the class of
persons for whose benefit the provisions of the foregoing
Agreements were intended to protect.
16. That the defendants breached their contractual obligations to Salt Lake City Corporation and Salt Lake
County and to the plaintiff as a third party beneficiary
thereof, by failing to enforce their supervisory powers
and control over the work to see that the same complied
with the contract therefor, and in failing to shut down
the work as they had the authority and duty to do after
discovering the hazardous and dangerous condition of
said excavation.
17. That as a direct and proximate result of said breach,
the plaintiff has suffered the following injuries and physical impairments: . . .
18 . . . 19 . . . 20 .
graphs of Complaint.

. are same as the Count I paraDONN E. CASSITY
Attorney for Plaintiff
404 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

EXHIBIT "A" (See R. 156-163)
The injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and Appellant
herein were of such a nature that, though he lives and
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his mind remains clear, he is totally unable to move
knowingly so much as a single muscle below his neck.
The Plaintiff and Appellant was a thirty-seven year old
man at the time of the accident, having a wife and three
children of tender age and had been on the job where he
was injured one working shift and for approximately an
hour prior to the cave-in which caused his injuries. Although there are many facts and thence testimony that
will be introduced into evidence in the District Court for
the Court and jury to consider relative to the negligence
of the Defendants and the consequent injuries to the
Plaintiff, the only issue before the Court at this time is
whether or not the Second Amended Complaint of the
Plaintiff states a cause of action and thus, those facts
which can be readily established for purposes of trial,
will not be here set forth. It is important to note, however, that the underground connecting service tunnel was
constructed according to the plans and specifications of
the Defendant architects, and was an important part of
"all of the work" that was being supervised by the Defendant architects.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT IN THAT SAID COMPLAINT
DOES STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UPON WHICH
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED, ON EACH AND ALL OF
THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS.
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A. WHERE A CONTRACT BETWEEN AN ARCHITECT AND AN OWNER REQUIRES INSPECTION AND SUPERVISION DURING CONSTRUCTION, THE ARCHITECT MUST EXERCISE REASONABLE DILIGENCE AND SKILL IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF THAT DUTY.
B. ARCHITECTS ARE UNDER A DUTY TO EXERCISE ORDINARY, REASONABLE CARE, TECHNICAL SKILL AND ABILITY AND DILIGENCE ,
SUCH AS rs ORDINARILY REQUIRED OF
ARCHITECTS, IN THE COURSE OF THEIR
PLANS, INSPECTIONS AND SUPERVISION
DURING CONSTRUCTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF ANY PERSON WHO FORESEEABLY
AND WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY MIGHT
BE INJURED BY THEIR FAILURE TO DO SO,
REGARDLESS OF PRIVITY, AND WHETHER OR
NOT THEY EXERCISED SUCH CARE IS A
QUESTION FOR THE JURY.
C. ARCHITECTS WHOSE DUTIES WERE NOT
LIMITED TO THE PREPARATION OF PLANS
AND SPECIFICATIONS, AND WHO WERE ALSO
EMPLOYED TO SUPERVISE THE CONSTRUCTION HAD THE DUTY TO SUPERVISE THE
PROJECT WITH DUE CARE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
D. BOTH THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND THE
ARCHITECTS BY VIRTUE OF THEIR CONTRACTS WITH THE OWNER AND THEIR POSITIONS WERE REQUIRED TO EXERCISE DUE
CARE AND SKILL FOR THE PROTECTION OF
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THE EMPLOYEES ON THE CITY-COUNTY MUNICIPAL COMPLEX.
E. THE QUESTION OF NEGLIGENCE OF ARCHI-

TECTS WHO WERE EMPLOYED BY THE CITYCOUNTY, NOT ONLY TO PREPARE PLANS
AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION
OF THE CITY-COUNTY COMPLEX, BUT ALSO
TO SUPERVISE CONSTRUCTION, IN FAILING
TO PROPERLY SUPERVISE THE SHORING
AND THE TAPERING OF THE WALLS OF THE
EXCAVATION TO PREVENT THE HAZARDOUS
CONDITION FROM ARISING, OR ONCE HAVING ARISEN FROM CONTINUING, RESULTING
IN COLLAPSE OF THE WALL OF THE EXCAVATION AND INJURIES TO THE EMPLOYEE
OF THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY.

F. AN ARCHITECT IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE
IN EXERCISING SUPERVISORY POWERS UNDER HIS CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT.
G. WHERE AN ARCHITECT KNEW OR IN THE
EXERCISE OF REASONABLE CARE SHOULD
HAVE KNOWN THAT A HAZARDOUS CONDITION EXISTED ENDANGERING EMPLOYEES
OF THE CONTRACTOR, THE ARCHITECT HAD
THE RIGHT AND THE CORRESPONDING DUTY
TO STOP THE WORK UNTIL THE UNSAFE
CONDITION HAD BEEN REMEDIED.
Liability of an architect is expressed in Montijo vs.
Swift (1963) 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133,
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wherein the Plaintiff brought an action against the Defendant architect who had designed and supervised the
construction of a stairway in a bus depot, for injuries
sustained when she fell while descending said stairs. The
court held as follows at pages 134-135 of 133 Cal. Rptr.
2d:
"Under the existing status of the law, an architect
who plans and supervises construction work, as an
independent contractor, is under a duty to exercise
ordinary care in the course thereof for the protection
of any person who foreseeably and with reasonable
certainty may be injured by his failure to do so, even
though such injury may occur after his work has
been accepted by the person engaging his services.
This conclusion is supported by the general principles declared and applied in Chance vs. Lawry's
Inc., 58 Cal-2d 368, 376, 377, 25 Cal. Rptr. 209, 374
Pac. 2d 185; Stewart vs. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d, 857, 862863, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 Pac. 2d 345; Dow vs. Holly
Manufacturing Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 724, 321 Pac. 2d
736; Hale vs. DePooll, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 231, 201 Pac.
2d 1, 13 ALR 2d 183, and Dahms vs. General Elevator
Co., 214 Cal. 733, 738-742, 7 P. 2d 1013. (See also
Prosser on Torts, 2nd edition, page 517; Rest. Torts
Sec. 385.)"
The New York Appellant Division in Clemens vs.
Benzinger, 211 App. Div. 586, 207 N.Y.S. 539 is cited
following a statement of a rule, at 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Architects, Sec. 25, which reads as follows:
"An architect's liability for negligence resulting in
personal injury or death may be based upon his
supervisory activities or upon defects in the plans."
In the Clemens vs. Benzinger case, the Plaintiff's decedent was an employee for a steel construction com-

17
pany building a baseball grandstand. Steel "H" columns
were placed on concrete bases in which the plans and
specifications required anchor bolts to be set at the time
the concrete was poured. This was not done on certain
columns and the anchor bolts were placed in holes drilled
in the concrete bases and the holes were then grouted in
with sand and cement, and part of the protruding lugs
on the anchor bolts were removed in order to fit the
drilled holes. The anchor bolts were so placed on the day
prior to the accident for the column which fell striking
the plaintiff's decedent and killing him. The falling
column pulled the anchor bolts up about six inches and
bent them over with green, partially hardened cement
showing at the top of the holes. The Court held that the
supervisory engineer who had prepared the plans and
specifications and had charge and supervision of the
construction was liable for negligence in the supervision
of the work, the same as for defects in original plans.
Thus the Court permitted recovery against the architect
for his supervisory activities, namely his failure to notify
the structural steel contractor of the actual conditions
of the anchor bolts after he had authorized and directed
the placing of the bolts in the drilled holes. See comment
in 59 A. L. R. 2d, 1085-1086.
In the instant case before the Court, the contract of
employment between the Defendant Corporation and Individual Architect and Salt Lake City and Salt Lake
County for architectural services in connection with the
design and the construction of the new Public Safety and
Jail Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, clearly provided
that the Defendant was to prepare the contract document
for letting the bids, for construction, and "to supervise
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and inspect all phases of the work" to be done thereunder. (See paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the Second Amended
Complaint). Contract documents prepared by the Defendant for Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County, whereby the construction of a building was let to Christiansen
Brothers, Inc. provided that ( 1) The Defendant corporation "will direct and supervise the construction" on behalf of the City and County, (2) The Contractor "shall
promptly obey and follow every order or direction which ·
shall be given by the architect*** in accordance with the
terms of the contract", (3) If, in the judgment of the
architect, it is necessary to close down the work because
of dangerous conditions or non-compliance with the
specifications, the contractor shall comply and stop all
operations upon written notice from the architect until
ordered to proceed by the architect and there shall be no
claim against the architect for such action, ( 4) The contractor shall take all necessary precautions for the safety
of the public and employees on the work, shall comply
with all applicable provisions of all federal, state and
municipal safety laws and building codes to prevent accidents or injuries to persons in the premises, and shall
erect and maintain at all times all necessary safeguards
for the protection of the public and workmen, and (5)
In order to safeguard life and property when earth banks
are too deep or steep, the contractor "shall provide adequate sheet piling*** to protect workmen." (See paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Second Amended Complaint, expressly setting forth the above contracted provisions). As alleged in the Second Amended Complaint,
the Defendants undertook the performance of their supervisory duties pursuant to the above designated con·
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tracts on behalf of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County
and knew of the dangerous conditions which precipitated
the caving in of the excavation on the plaintiff for many
days prior to the accident. (See paragraphs 12 and 14 of
the Second Amended Complaint). (R. 146-155).
In a 1953 case, known as Paxton vs. Alameda County,
et al, 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 259 Pac. 2d 934, the Plaintiff
brought an action for injuries suffered when sheathing
in a roof over a building being constructed for Defendant
County pursuant to specifications prepared by Defendant
architect, gave way as Plaintiff was carrying buckets
of hot tar thereon. The Plaintiff alleged the architect was
negligent in specifying one inch by six inch sheathing
with a spread of thirty inches between the rafters, and
that the county was negligent for approving such plans,
and, additionally, that sheathing of lower grade than that
specified was used and the county was chargeable with
notice thereof through its agents who supervised and inspected the work of construction. The architect in that
case had the contractual obligation to prepare the plans
and specifications and to direct and supervise the construction work and thereby was the responsible agent of
the county to see that the building was completed in strict
accordance with the plans and specifications therefor.
Plaintiff recovered a $25,000 judgment against the architect and the county. Upon appeal, the Appellate Court
held that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the architect had negligently specified sheathing
material which was of insufficient strength and, therefore, reversed the judgment against the architect upon
the narrow allegation of negligence against him contained in the complaint. As to the county, the Appellate

20

Court affirmed the judgment upon the ground that
sheathing of a lower grade than specified was used resulting in a dangerous and defective condition, the architect had notice thereof and had authority to remedy the
condition and that the county's agent, the architect, had
discovered the inferior lumber prior to its placement on
the roof and was negligent in not making another inspection of the roof until after the sheathing was in place. In
so holding the court recognized the liability of the county
for the negligent acts of the architect as its agent and in
order to clarify the anomaly of the agent not being jointly
liable with the county for his negligent acts, the court
stated in footnote 5 on page 945 of 259 Pac. 2d Rptr. as
follows:
"While it may seem anomalous to hold the principal
(the county) and not the agents (Hass) liable, the
reason is that the cause of action against Hass was
narrowly limited to alleged "specification" of inferior material, but was not thus limited as against
the county."
The undisputed import of the holding in this case
which is almost identical to the case at bar with respect
to the failure of the architect to exercise his supervisory
powers is that the architect would have been jointly liable with the county for his negligent omission which resulted in injury to the plaintiff, had the complaint been
so drafted. Any other conclusion would violate every
recognized rule of agency and liability under the doctrine
of respondeat superior. Thus the Court permitted an employee on the job to recover against the principal county
for the negligent supervision and inspection of the construction work by the architect agent. An error in
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pleading only permitted the architect to avoid joint liability with the county in the Paxton case.
In the case of Craviolini vs. Scholer and Fuller As-

sociated Architects, 89 Ariz. 24, 357 Pac. 2d 611, the court
observed as follows at page 614 of 357 Pac. 2d Rptr.:
·'Thus the architect has no immunity as an architect;**':' he may in the construction of a building
assume many roles - planner, designer, supervisor,
arbitrator and owner's agent. In the role of arbitrator, and in that role alone, goes the cloak of imrn.unity."
In 1965, the Illinois Appellate Court, in a case known
as Miller vs. DeWitt, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 208 N. E. 2d 249,
sustained a jury verdict against defendant architects
wherein the jury had held in favor of three injured employees of the contractor and found the architects negligent in the supervision of the work and awarded Miller
$30,000; Furry $90,000 and Plaintiff Engel $5,000 against
the defendant architects under both the negligent count
of the complaint as well as the structural work act count
of the Plaintiff's Complaint. In this case, the defendantarchitect prepared plans to remodel the west wall of a
gymnasium. The architects prepared the necessary plans,
specifications and proposed contracts and caused bids
to be received which resulted in the letting of three contracts, one to Fisher-Stoune, Inc. for the general construction work, one for the plumbing and heating and
one for the electrical work. Plans for the remodeling job
called for the renewal of the west wall of the gymnasium;
removal of a proscenium truss from that point to the new
west wall of the new gymnasium; the removal of two
steel columns in the old west wall, which together with
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the proscenium truss originally supported the west ends
of four east-west roof trusses; the substitution of a new
north-south main bearing truss into which would be
fastened the west ends of the old roof trusses and the
east ends of the trusses in the new structure.
The relevant provision of the contract between the
architects and the school district were as follows:
"l. The Architect's Services: The architect's professional services consist of the necessary conference,
the preparation of preliminary studies, working
drawings, specifications, large scale and full size detail drawings, for architectural, structural, plumbing, heating, electrical and other mechanical work;
obtaining approval of government agencies having
jurisdiction over certain phases of the work consisting of fire marshall, health department, county
superintendent of schools and department of education; assistance in the drafting of forms of proposals
and contracts; the issuance of certificates of payment, the keeping of accounts, and the general administration of the construction contracts and supervision of the work." (Emphasis added)

* * * *

"6. Supervision of the Work: The architect will endeavor to guard the owner against defects and deficiency in the work of the contractors, but he does
not guarantee the performance of their contracts.
The supervision of an architect is to be distinguished
from the continuous personal superintendance to be
obtained by the employment of a clerk-of-the-works.
When authorized by the owner, a clerk-of-the-works
acceptable to both Owner and Architect shall be engaged by the architect at a salary satisfactory to the
Owner, and paid by the Owner, upon presentation
of the Architect's monthly statements."

1

23
The construction contract between Fisher-Stoune, Inc.
and the school district provided in its relevant parts, as
follows:
"Article 1. Scope of the Work.
'The General Contractor shall furnish all of the materials and perform all of the work to complete the
general work shown on the drawings and described
in the specifications entitled 'Second Addition to
Maroa High School, Community Unit School District
No. 2, Makin and DeWitt Counties, Illinois'."
"Article 6. The Contract Documents.
"The general conditions of the contract, the specifications and the drawings, together with this Agreement, form the contract and they are as fully a part
of the contract as if attached or herein repeated."
"Article 12. Protection of Work and Property.
"The Contractor shall continuously maintain adequate protection of all his work from damage and
shall protect the Owner's property from injury or
loss arising in connection with this contract. He shall
make good any such damage, injury or loss except
such as may be directly due to errors in the contract
documents or caused by agents or employees of the
Owner or due to causes beyond the contractor's control and not to his fault or negligence. He shall adequately protect adjacent property as provided by law
and the contract documents."

"The contractor shall take all necessary precautions
for the safety of the employees on the work and shall
comply with all applicable provtsions of federal, state
and municipal safety laws and building codes to prevent accident or injury to persons on, about or adjacent to the premises where the work is being per-
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formed. He shall erect and properly maintain at all

times as required by the conditions and progress of
the work all necessary safeguards for the protection
of the workmen and the public and shall post danger
signs warning against the hazards created by such
features of construction as protruding nails, holes,
elevator hatchways, scaffolding, window openings,
stairways and falling materials; and he shall designate a responsible member of his organization on the
work, whose duty shall be the prevention of accidents. The name and position of any person so designated shall be reported to the Architect by the Contractor." (Emphasis added)
"Article 13. Inspection of Work.
"The Architect and his representative shall at all
times have access to the work wherever it is in preparation or progress and the Contractor shall provide
proper facilities for such access and for inspection."
"Article 14. Superintendent: Supervision:
"The Contractor shall keep on his work during its
progress a competent superintendent and any necessary assistants, all satisfactory to the Architect... "
"The Contractor shall give efficient supervision to
the work using his best skill and attention ... "
"Article 15. Changes in the Work:
" ... In giving instructions, the Architect shall have
authority to make minor changes in the work not involving extra cost and not inconsistent with the purposes of the building ... "
"Article 19. Correction of Work Before Final Payment:
"The Contractor shall promptly remove from the
premises all work condemned by the Architect as
failing to conform to the Contract ... "

1
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"Article 38. Architect's Status.
"The Architect shall have general superv1s10n and
direction of the work . . . He (the Architect) has
authority to stop the work whenever such stoppage
may be necessary to insure the proper execution of
the Contract ... "
"Article 55. Protection:
''Bracing, shoring and sheeting: The Contractor
shall provide all bracing, shoring and sheeting as
required for safety and for the proper execution of
the work and have same removed when the work is
completed."
The Illinois Appellate Court took into consideration
the contractual provisions between Architect and Owner
and between Owner and Contractor as well as the conduct of the Architect in determining whether or not the
verdict of the jury that the Architect was negligent by
omission in causing the injuries to the plaintiffs. The
Court refers to the Paxton vs. Alameda case, ibid. as
follows: (Emphasis added)
"The only complaint of the Plaintiff against the
Architect there was of alleged negligence in the
plans and specifications, not in any supervision, and
on the particular facts there presented, which are not
analagous to those here, they were held not negligent. But the defendant county was held liable because the sheeting actually used was not as specified,
was insufficient, and the Architect had authority to
remedy such and did not do so. By implication at
least, it would seem that had the Complaint against
the defendant Architects been based on alleged negligent supervision (as well as alleged negligent plans
and specifications), which for some reason it was not,
the court likely would have held the Architects liable
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consistent with its determination of the cause as
against the defendant county."
The opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court in Miller
vs. DeWitt continues as follows:
"Under the Agreement of the Owner and the defendant's Architects here, they were to perform professional services, consisting of, so far as now relevant, conferences, preliminary studies, working
drawings, specifications, large scale and full size detail drawings for architectural, structural, plumbing,
heating, electrical and other mechanical work, etc.,
assisting in drafting proposals and contracts, etc. and
the general administration of the construction contracts and supervision of the work . . . The supervision of the Architects was to be distinguished from
the continuous personal superintendance to be obtained by the employment of a clerk-of-the-works ..
The Contractor was to take all necessary precautions
for the safety of employees on the work, comply with
all applicable provisions of state laws to prevent accidents or injury to persons on, about or adjacent to
the premises and designate a responsible member of
his organization on the work whose duty shall be
the prevention of accidents, the name and position of
such person to be reported to the Architect. The
Architect was to have at all times access to the
work ... the Contractor must not have or permit
any part of the structure to be loaded with a weight
that will endanger its safety. He must provide all
bracing, shoring and sheeting required for safety
and for proper execution of the work ... Although
we do not believe there is any significant applicable
ambiguity in the several agreements and contract
documents as to the Architects' functions, if it be
thought these qualifications lend some ambiguity,
the several documents having been prepared by the

'
'

,

,
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Architects are to be construed where construction is
necessary, most strongly against them. They had
general supervision and direction of the work, they
had authority to stop the work whenever necessary
to insure proper execution of the contract, they were
in the first instance, the interpreters of the contract
and the judges of the performance, they had to use
their powers thereunder to enforce its faithful performance, and they had to, within a reasonable time,
make decisions on all matters as to the execution and
progress of the work and interpretation of the contract documents ... They were to have at all times
access to the work wherever it was in preparation
or progress . . . They could condemn any work as
failing to conform to the contract whether incorporated or not and the Contractor must remove such.
The General Contractor, the general administration
of whose Contract and supervision and direction of
whose work was vested in the Architects, who were
to endeavor to guard against defects and deficiency
therein, who could stop the work when necessary,
who were the first interpreters of the Contract and
first judges of its performance, who were to enforce
its faithful performance and make decisions on all
matters as to execution and progress of the work
and interpretation of the documents, was to do the
general work shown on the drawings and specifications and do everything required by the Agreement,
general conditions, specifications and drawings, to
take all necessary precautions for the safety of employees, to comply with all applicable state safety
laws to prevent accidents or injury, to have a responsible member on the work to prevent accidents,
to keep on the work a competent superintendent and
any necessary assistants, to give efficient supervision
to the work, using his best skill and attention, and
carefully study and compare all drawings, specifica-
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tions and other instructions, to not have or permit
any part of the structure to be loaded as to endanger
its safety, to provide all bracing and shoring required
for safety and proper execution of the work, to complete all structural steel, to carefully shore and brace
existing structural steel for installation of new steel
to carefully remove the existing truss re-used, and
to provide new connections for the existing trusses
and other structural steel members."
"Such were the functions of the Defendant's Architects including the things the general contractor
was to do under his contract and his work, the general administration of which contract and supervision and direction of which work was vested in the
Architects."

1

The above itemization by the Illinois Appellate Court
of the duties and obligations of the Contractor which
were to be supervised and approved by the Architects
under the provisions of the respective Contracts, are si1nilar as explained in the pleading entitled Second
Amended Complaint of the Plaintiff and Appellant here- '
in and the following language of the Illinois Appellate
Court is applicable to the instant case as well, which
reads as follows:
"The terms of the Architects' employment are governed by the terms of the contracts entered into.
Their duties here were not limited to the preparation
of plans and specifications. They also included in
addition supervision of construction. The Architects
in contracting for their services, implied that they
possessed skill and ability sufficient to enable them
to perform the required services at least ordinarily
and reasonably well and that they would exercise
and apply in the case their skill, ability and judgment

1
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reasonably and without neglect. They held themselves out as experts in their particular line of work
and were employed because they were believed to be
such. The skill and diligence which they were bound
to exercise are such as are ordinarily required of
architects. The efficiency of an Architect in the preparation of plans and specifications is tested by the
rule of ordinary and reasonable skill usually exercised by one in that profession. He must guard
against defects in the plans as to design, materials
and construction and he must keep abreast of the improvements of the times. In the absence of a special
agreement, their undertaking did not imply or guarantee a perfect plan or satisfactory results and they
are liable only for failure to exercise reasonable care
and skill. The degree of skill and care which may be
required of them in the preparation of their plans
was a question for the jury. An Architect will be
liable where by reason of his breach of duty to exercise care and skill, his plans and specifications were
faulty and defective as to design, materials or construction. Liability rests on unskillfulness or negligence, not upon mere errors of judgment and the
question of the Architect's negligence in the preparation of plans is one of fact and within the province
of the jury."
The Illinois Appellate Court went on to discuss further
possible areas of negligence on the part of the Architects
which is particularly applicable to the instant case. The
Court continued as follows:
"The Architects may be liable for negligence in failing to exercise the ordinary skill of their profession,
which results in the erection of an unsafe structure,
whereby anyone lawfully on the premises is injured.
Their possible liability for negligence resulting in
personal injuries may be based upon thei~ super-
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visory activities or upon defects in the plans or both.
Their possible liability is not limited to the owner
who employed them. Privity of Contract is not a
prerequisite to liability. They were under a duty to
exercise ordinary reasonable care, technical skill and
ability and diligence as are ordinarily required of
Architects in the course of their plans, inspections
and supervision during construction for the protection of any person who foreseeably and with reasonable certainty might be injured by their failure to
do so, and whether or not they so eocercise such is a
question to be determined by the jury. The position
and authority of the Architects here under these
documents and these facts and circumstances were
such that they necessarily labor under a duty, inter
alia, to supervise the project with due care under the
circumstances. Too much control over the general
contractor necessarily rests with the Architects under these facts for them not to be placed under a duty
imposed by law to perform without negligence all
their functions, including plans, specificatibns, general administration of the construction contracts,
and supervision and direction of the work. Their
power to stop the work is, alone, a drastic power,
and that authority and all their other extensive authority as it relates to administration, supervision
and direction, necessarily carries commensurate legal
responsibility. The Architects were to be paid in part
to do their best to see to it that the terms of the contract between the Owner and the general contractor
were complied with. They were employed in part,
not so much to detect the fact that the general contractor had erected inadequate temporary supports,
shoring, columns, or towers, if they were inadequate,
as they were to use their best efforts, skill, judgment,
care and experience to guard against and prevent
that being done. Both the general contractor and the
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Architects by virtue of their contract with the Owner
and their positions were required to exercise care
and skill for the protection of the employees on the
job. It must have been reasonably within the Architects' contemplation when directing their minds to
the removal and relocation of the old north-south
proscenium truss, ... that such persons as the plaintijfs employees on the jobs would necessarily be affected by the Architects' several pertinent decisions
in the course thereof." (Emphasis added)
The Architects urged the Court to conclude that the
liability of the Architects was limited to design and use
of materials, etc., and the Court answered this problem
appropriately as follows:
"The Defendants Architects urge that under a contract to "supervise the work" of construction, an
Architect undertakes only a duty to see that a building is constructed, which, when completed, meets
the plans and specifications and is the building for
which the Owner contracted and that he has no
rights or duties with regard to the manner or means
or techniques of construction adopted by the contractor to produce that end result. One of the Defendants Architects' duties here undoubtedly was
as they say, but that was by no means their only
duty. Under these contracts and associated documents, they had many other powers, authorities, responsibilities and duties. Some of their rights and
correvelant duties did relate to some of what the
Defendants Architects possf.bly refer to as manners
or means or techniques of construction of the contractor. But it would be useless to exercise in semantics and speculation to endeavor to examine or define
or classify (which the Architects here do not do)
what is means by manners or means or techniques of
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construction of the contractor and as to which ones
the Architects had duties and as to which ones they
had no duties. Under these contracts and documents
and under these facts and circumstances, they have
substantial relevant and applicable duties to persons
in the position of these Plaintiffs as we've set forth
whether those be considered to relate, in part, t~
what are possibly denominated to be manners or
means or techniques of construction or to something
,
else." (Emphasis added)
The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed
the Illinois Appellate Court decision and filed the Su- ,
preme Court decision on approximately the 24th of
March, 1966, and although Appellant herein has a copy
of the Supreme Court decision, unfortunately at the time
of this printing does not have a copy of the citation. However, by time of argument of the case before the Supreme
Court herein, it is anticipated that a citation will be
available. The Supreme Court, after first reviewing some
of the pertinent facts relative to provisions in the OwnerArchitect Contract and the Owner-Contractor Contract '
stated in brief as follows relative to the negligence of the
Architects:

"It appears that the parties agree that Architects

must exercise reasonable care in the performance of
their duties and may be liable to persons who may
foreseeably be injured by their failure to exercise
such care, regardless of privity. The principal question is the extent of the Architects' duties. It is clear
from the evidence that the Architects did not prepare detailed specifications for the temporary shoring of the gymnasium roof, nor did they compute on
the plans the load that would be placed upon the
shores, or provide the contractor with a safety factor
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to be used in the shoring. It also appears that the
Architects did not oversee and inspect the shoring
as used.
"As we view the record, the finding of negligence on
the part of the Architects must be based upon one or
more of these omissions. As a general rule, it has
been said that the general duty to "supervise the
work" merely creates a duty to see that the building,
when constructed, meets the plans and specifications
contracted for. Clinton vs. Boehm, 124 N. Y. S. 789,
139 App. Div. 73; Garden City Floral Company vs.
Hunt, 126 Mont. 537, 255 Pac. 2d 352, 356; Day vs.
National U. S. Radiator Corp., 241 La. 288, 128 So.
2d 660, 666.
"In the present case, the contract between the school
district and the contractor, which was prepared by
the Architects, provided in part as follows:
'The Contractor shall provide all bracing, shoring
and sheeting as required for safety and for the
proper execution of the work. * * *
'Existing structural steel shall be carefully shored
and braced as required for installation of new connecting steel. Existing truss re-used shall be carefully removed, revised and re-erected as called
for***.
"Despite the argument of the Architects that the
shoring here was a method or technique of construction over which they had no control, we feel that
under the terms of the contracts, the Architects had
the right to interfere if the Contractor began to shore
in an obviously unsafe and hazardous manner. We
agree with the Architects that they had no duty to
specify the method the contractor would use in shoring, but we believe that under the terms of these
contracts, the Architects had the right to insist upon
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a safe and adequate use of the method. Cf. Charles
Meads & Co. vs. City of New York, 181 N.Y.S. 704
706."
,
The Court continues its analysis of the case hitting at
the very heart of this Plaintiff-Appellant's case before
this Court, as follows:

"From a careful examination of the record, we conclude that if the Architects knew, or in the exercise
of reasonable care, should have known that the shor- '
ing was inadequate and unsafe, they had the right
and corresponding duty to stop the work until the
unsafe condition had been remedied. (Earhart vs. '
Hummonds, 232 Ark. 133, 334 S. W. 2d 869). If the 1
Architects breached such a duty, they would be ,
l~able to these Plaintiffs who could foreseeably be
injured by the breach. (Emphasis added)

"Here it appears that the shoring and removal of part
of the old gymnasium roof was a major part of the
entire remodeling operation and one that involved
obvious hazards. We think that the shoring operation was of such importance that the jury could find ,
from the evidence that the Architects were guilty of
negligence in failing to inspect and watch over the
shoring operation. Cf. Day vs. National U. S. Radiator Corp., 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660.
"We therefore find that the trial court did not err in
refusing to direct a verdict for defendants on the '
commonlaw negligence counts." (Emphasis added)
The excavated tunnel of a depth of approximately 25
feet was a substantial part of the construction work related to the Salt Lake City-County Municipal Complex
which the defendants Architects had contracted to
"supervise and inspect all phases of the work being
done". The facts of the case, when once permitted to be
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adduced before the Court and jury will show that the
Architect, in fact, knew that the excavation had been
done for some days and weeks prior to the injuries of the
plaintiff in a manner contrary to the statutory requirements imposed upon those who would so excavate to
such a depth. The evidence will show that the shoring
and taper of the walls of the trench were not only obviously unsafe and hazardous, but that the Architect at
all times was fully aware of the said unsafe and hazardous condition. As in the Miller vs. DeWitt case, the Defendant Architects in the instant case had the right to
stop the work until the unsafe condition had been remedied, but at no time did so. Certainly as in the opinion
above stated, the Defendants Architects had not only the
right, but "the corresponding duty to stop the work until
the unsafe condition had been remedied." In the instant
case the Defendant Architects breached the duty owing
to the Plaintiff. In the instant case, as the evidence will
indicate, the Defendants Architects at all times, while
the excavation and work was being carried on by the
contractor upon the particular tunnel area, had a qualified on-site inspector, which was acceptable to both the
Owner and the Architects during the entire time the construction work was in progress, supervising and inspecting all phases of the work being done and was fully aware
of conditions and progress of the work, and reported
daily to his superiors Defendants Architects. In addition
to this, the Architects were upon the job on numerous
occasions and observed personally and in behalf of the
defendant Architect Corporation the progress of the
work, the hazardous condition, and on at least one occasion had a conference relative to the hazardous con-
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dition wherein it was very thoroughly discussed by the
Contractor, representatives of the Owner, and the Architect himself, together with his on-site inspector.
It is important to note, in light of the Miller vs. DeWitt
opinion, that in the complaint of the Plaintiff herein,
there is no allegation that the Architects negligently prepared plans or specifications for shoring or in any way
negligently prepared plans and specifications relating to
the work from which the injuries resulted. The Supreme
Court of Illinois covers this subject as follows:
"There is no evidence that it is the customary or
usual practice for Architects to plan shoring or provide specifications therefor. There is no evidence that
the Contractor relied on the plans or specifications or
requested advice of the Architects in constructing
the shoring. All of the testimony of the Architects
who appeared as experts indicated that the plans
and specifications were sufficient and proper. Only
one witness, Dean Wurth, an engineer, but not a
licensed Architect, testified over objection, that a
structural engineer should indicate the load to be
shored on the drawing. There was no testimony that
this was necessary to meet the standard of learning,
skill and conduct ordinarily possessed by Architects
or even structural engineers, practicing in the same
or similar localities. See Paxton vs. Alameda Co.,
119 Cal. App. 383, 259 Pac. 2d 934, 938.
"We feel that except for the duty to stop work in the
event of an obviously hazardous dereliction of duty
on the part of the contractor, the Architects were
under no duty with regard to the methods, means,
or techniques used by the Contractor to shore the
roof."
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In the instant case as alleged, the defendants failed to
shut down the work and require the hazardous condition
to be corrected when they knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that a hazardous
and dangerous condition existed which might foreseeably injure the plaintiffs or other employees of the contractor. (R. 150 Par. 14) The Supreme Court of Illinois
in the Miller vs. DeWitt case, while upholding the Illinois
Appellate Division as to the liability and the negligence
of the Architect remanded the case for a trial. The lower
court had instructed the jury on certain allegations of
negligence in the Complaint of the Plaintiffs, but refused
all of the Defendants' tendered instructions relating to
the extent or limitation of the Architect's responsibility
for the shoring method used. The Court felt that since
the jury had been instructed that the Architects perhaps
were responsible for the method and technique used in
shoring, etc., that the jury might have erroneously relied
upon the instructions and held the Architects negligent
for their failure to specify procedures, techniques, etc.
for the shoring instead of the basis upon which the jury
could have found the Defendant Architects negligent
and liable, according to law which in such a case is the
failure of the Architects to inspect and watch over the
shoring operation and to exercise the "right and corresponding duty to stop the work until the unsafe condition had been remedied."
In Plaintiff's case, the Defendants executed a contract
which required that the Architects Defendants "supervise and inspect all phases of the work being done". The
construction contract provided that the Defendants "will
direct the supervision of the construction". The said con-
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tract also provided that the Contractor "shall promptly
obey and follow every order or direction which shall be
given by the Architect and/or the City Engineer or the
County Engineer in accordance with the terms of the
contract". The construction contract also provided that
"If in the judgment of the Arch~l-tect and/or the City Engineer or the County Engineer, it is necessary to close
down the work due to inclement weather or due to other
circumstances arising during the progress of the work,
that may be construed to be dangerous or that may be
caused by noncompliance with the specifications; the
contractor shall comply and he shall stop all operations
upon written notice from the Architect and/or City Engineer or the County Engineer so to do, and the work shall
remain closed down until further orders in writing are
given by said Architect and/or City Engineer or County
Engineer . . . " (Emphasis added)

The supervisory and inspection duty of the defendants
relate to "all phases of the work being done" under the
construction contract and the plans and specifications
prepared by the defendants. A phase of the work is referred to in paragraph 1 (b) and 17 (a) of the special
condition section of the construction contract wherein
the contractor was required in his work, "supervised and
inspected" by the defendants to 1 (b) "take all necessary
precautions for the safety of the public and employees
on the work and shall comply with all applicable provi·
sions of Federal, state and municipal laws and building
codes to prevent accidents or injury on, about or adjacent
to the premises where the work is being performed ... "
Under 17 (a) of the construction contract under the
title Shoring, the contract reads as follows:

39

"Contractor shall provide and be responsible for all
temporary shoring required for "executing and protecting the work".
Can it be reasonably argued that Defendants were to
supervise and inspect all phases of the work, yet be allowed arbitrarily to distinguish from their contractual
duty some "phases" of the work as being outside or beyond Defendants' contractual duty? Such reasoning
would make a shambles and mockery of the intent and
specific language of the contract between the Defendants
and Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County, dated March 1,
1960. Such a reasoning would also make ineffectual and
verbage of the sections of the construction contract relating to the powers of supervision of the Architect as
recited here and in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.
The Architect, in part, was employed to see that the
contractor performed as per the construction agreement
and built as per the plans and specifications prepared by
the defendants. Certain duties arose as a consequence of
the agreement, "to supervise and inspect all phases of
the work". Reasonably the intent and belief of the "Owner" was that the Defendants were qualified to supervise
and inspect and to "exercise" sound judgments and issue sound directives wherever they, as allowed and required by the said contracts, did so, as a result of their
efforts expended to complete construction within the
terms of the plans, specifications, construction agreement
and "all phases of the work". The Defendants and Respondents have contended in arguments heretofore that
there was no duty on the Defendants to supervise the
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work or to shut down work unless the specific work in
progress was being performed contrary to the plans and
specifications prepared by the Architect which, of course,
violates the very reasoning the Illinois Supreme Court in
Miller vs. DeWitt. The fact is the excavation of the trench
as a phase of the work was performed contrary to law,
and contrary to safety of personnel employed on the
work. As alleged in Plaintiff's Second Amended Com.
plaint, paragraph 14, the Defendants knew by their inspection and contract with government safety inspectors
and by their own experience that this phase of the work
being performed by the Contractor was creating a haz.
ardous condition; they knew that the Defendants by
terms of the agreements and power vested in them as
Architects could require a shut down of that phase of the
work until it was made safe; and Defendants knew their
judgment was not subject to "claim" by the Architect.
(See Paragraph 9, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Page 4, Line 8, R. 149).

,

'

•

,
,

Despite full knowledge of the existence of the hazard
and danger to "employees on the work" and the unlawful
and negligent manner in which the excavation phase of
the work was being performed for many days before the
injuries to Plaintiff, the Defendants, as the contractually
and lawfully constituted supervisor and inspector of the
work, allowed unlawfully hazardous and dangerous
progress of that phase of the work to continue until an •
uninformed employee was damaged for the balance of
his life.
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CONCLUSION
The law by the reasoning of the Courts throughout the
land requires the conclusion that in the instant case the
Complaint of Arthur Nauman does state a cause of action
upon which relief may be granted against the Defendants.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
DONN E. CASSITY
EUGENE H. DAVIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant

